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Abstract 
Predicting the effect of persuasion campaigns is difficult, as 
belief changes may cascade through a network. In recent 
years, political campaigns have adopted micro-targeting 
strategies that segment voters into fine-grained clusters for 
more specific targetting. At present, there is little evidence 
that explores the efficiency of this method. Through an 
Agent-Based Model, the current paper provides a novel 
method for exploring predicted effects of strategic persuasion 
campaigns.  
The voters in the model are rational and revise their beliefs 
in the propositions expounded by the politicians in 
accordance with Bayesian belief updating through a source 
credibility model.  
The model provides a proof of concept and shows strategic 
advantages of micro-targeted campaigning. Despite having 
only little voter data allowing crude segmentation, the micro-
targeted campaign consistently beat stochastic campaigns 
with the same reach. However, given substantially greater 
reach, a positively perceived stochastic candidate can nullify 
or beat a strategic persuasion campaigns.  
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campaigns; Politics; Voting simulation 
Introduction 
Persuasion is paramount in political campaigns, and source 
credibility is a key component of a successful campaign. It 
influences a range of human cognitive phenomena related to 
reasoning, argumentation, and judgement and decision-
making. It influences the reception of persuasive messages 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994), 
plays a vital part in the development of children’s 
perception of the world (Harris & Corriveau, 2011), impacts 
juror decision making (Lagnado et al., 2012), increases 
adherence with persuasion strategies (Cialdini, 2007), and 
influences how people are seen in social situations (Fiske et 
al., 2007; Cuddy et al., 2011). The specific normative 
function of source credibility in argumentation, however, is 
still debated. For example, the dual-process-based 
Elaboration-Likelihood Model (Petty, 1981) assigns 
message source to heuristic rather than analytic cues (Briñol 
& Petty, 2009) whilst recent Bayesian models integrate 
credibility in revising beliefs when given evidence from a 
source (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; Hahn et al., 2012; 
Harris et al., 2015).  
Trustworthiness is an important factor in politics. It 
increases public policy compliance (Ayres & Braithwaite, 
1992), influences candidate choice (Citirin & Muste, 1999), 
increases intention of voting (Householder & LaMarre, 
2014, though not necessarily actual voting, see Dermody et 
al., 2010), increases societal cooperation (Fukuyama, 1995), 
and lack of trust may instigate civic participation (see Levi 
& Stoker, 2000 for a discussion of this). The current paper 
expands upon these findings by showing how source 
credibility influences the convincingness of an argument for 
a proposed candidate. 
In political literature, credibility factors include integrity, 
competence, fairness, flip-flopping, honest, equitable, and 
being responsiveness to public needs (Citrin & Muste, 1999; 
Levi & Stoker, 2000). Collating these, Mayer and 
colleagues identify credibility as ability, benevolence, and 
integrity (Mayer et al., 1995; Mayer & Davis, 1999). 
Empirical exploration of management corroborates such a 
definition (Colquitt et al., 2011 for a review) while social 
psychology partitions reliability in two main spheres: 
warmth and competence (Fiske et al., 2006; 2007; Cuddy et 
al., 2011). Further studies in management literature differ in 
whether they identify two (Jarvenpaa et al., 1998) or three 
credibility traits (Mayer et al., 1995).  
The model employed in the paper is in line with the 
factors identified in the above studies. Specifically, we 
divide credibility into two factors: expertise (the capability 
to provide accurate information) and trustworthiness (the 
willingness to provide accurate information).  
Micro-targeted campaigns 
Political campaigns attempt to persuade voters that they 
should support and vote for a particular candidate or 
political position. Unsurprisingly, the competitive nature of 
electoral campaigns has led to the development of strategies 
regarding belief updating and behaviour changes, in 
particular through the use of data and voter segmentation 
(O’Neil, 2016). Typically, an election campaign is divided 
into two phases: a persuasion phase that focuses on 
changing the minds of the voters and a “get-out-the-vote” 
phase that focuses on making sure the voters do indeed turn 
out for the election. While the former phase typically lasts 
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for the duration of the entire campaign, the latter is typically 
implemented in the final 3-4 days (see Green & Gerber, 
2008). In the current paper, we focus on the element of 
political campaigns concerned with changing the minds of 
the voters (i.e. the persuasion phase). Specifically, we 
explore the potential strategy advantages of knowing the 
voters’ attitudes towards the persuader (the politician). 
Companies increasingly accrue data on their customers. 
Given potential access to and purchase of large-scale data 
sets about voters, recent years have seen the development of 
specifically targeted political campaigns, known as micro-
targeted campaigns (MTCs, see Issenberg, 2012). While 
traditional campaigns use rough voter segmentation such as 
by gender, income, or place of habitation, individual voter 
models allow for fine-grained segmentation (e.g., upper-
middle class, Caucasian, suburban, father, Prius-owner, 
Seattleite; as well as top-five travel destinations, frequented 
news sites, etc.). Such data allows for highly specified 
models of the individual voter concerning political leaning, 
policy priorities, and voting likelihood. The models allow 
for targeted political adverts that address specific political 
issues in a way that is tailored to the individual in question.  
There is currently little academic research conducted on 
the effect and strategic administration of micro-targeted 
campaigns in elections. First, micro-targeted models are a 
recent element in election campaigns (Issenberg, 2008). As 
such, most models actually used in campaigns are subject to 
non-disclosure agreements and are kept by the responsible 
companies. Second, it is difficult to assess the quality of 
campaigns; partly due to the aforementioned secrecy 
regarding the exact models, and partly due to the complexity 
of campaigns, given the number of free parameters and the 
uniqueness of each campaign.  
The current paper focuses on changes of electorate beliefs 
and not on the likelihood of voting (at the end of the 
simulation (i.e. campaign period), all voters vote with a 
probability of 1). Election campaigns unfold over time, 
where campaigns can contact voters and attempt to persuade 
them. As such, the persuasion attempt of the politician is a 
successive campaign designed to convince the electorate 
that the voters should support the persuader in question.  
 While we do not test specific campaign models, the 
paper provides a proof concerning the potential effect of 
micro-targeted campaign strategies through Agent-Based 
Model simulation of interactions between politicians and 
voters. We stress the exploratory nature of the study, as the 
model is necessarily simplified. Rather than testing the 
predictive power of a specific voter model, we explore the 
strategic potential of MTCs through a Bayesian source 
credibility model, which has been developed and tested in 
previous studies. In the following, we present Agent-Based 
Models as a technique for exploring the development of 
aggregate patterns (such as changes in beliefs in a 
population) across time. Aside from testing the potential 
effectiveness of MTCs, the paper presents Agent-Based 
Models (ABMs) as a novel method for simulating the 
predicted effect of persuasion campaigns. 
A Bayesian source credibility model 
Bayesian approaches to reasoning and belief revision take 
point of departure in subjective, probabilistic degrees of 
beliefs in propositions where Bayes’ theorem captures the 
posterior degree of belief given a prior belief in the 
hypothesis and some new evidence (Oaksford & Chater, 
2007). The approach has been applied to argumentation 
theory (Hahn & Oaksford, 2006; 2007) where findings 
suggest that Bayesian reasoning may account for crucial 
elements of human information integration in practical 
reasoning. Most relevant to the current model, researchers 
have used Bayesian approaches to describe how humans 
integrate uncertain information from more or less reliable 
sources (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003). The model has been 
tested empirically (Harris et al., 2015; Madsen, 2016) and 
enjoys a good fit with observed responses.  
Taking point of departure from the Bayesian source 
credibility model, credibility is defined as a combination of 
trustworthiness and expertise (Hahn et al., 2009; Harris et 
al., 2015; see Fig. 1). In order to implement this model and 
to facilitate communication between persuaders (politicians) 
and persuadees (voters) and to capture the desired belief 
updating process, the members of the electorate have 
subjectively estimated beliefs about the credibility of each 
persuader. 
 
Fig. 1: A Bayesian source credibility model1 
Expertise refers to whether or not the persuader is capable 
of providing accurate and relevant information. For 
example, a politician may know the legislative framework 
connected with a policy proposal (thus increasing the 
chances of providing legislation that is legal and within 
constitutional law), a doctor may be more qualified to 
diagnose an illness compared with a layperson and so forth. 
Conversely, trustworthiness refers to the intention of 
providing accurate information. Regardless of the expertise 
of the source, the speaker might wish to misinform, lie, or 
otherwise deceive the listener. Expertise and trustworthiness 
are orthogonal and independent in the model (see Fig. 1) 
such that a person can be inexpert and yet intend to 
represent her available information as accurately as possible 
or a person can be highly expert within a field, but wish to 
misinform the listener. The source credibility model used in 
the current paper has previously been tested on appeals to 
political authority, which suggests that the model captures 
                                                            
1 P(E) = perceived expertise (0-1); P(T) = perceived trust (0-1); 
Rep is the represented statement (e.g., Hypothesis = 1) 
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part of how voters update their beliefs when politicians 
publically endorse or critique a policy (Madsen, 2016).  
As explained later, the persuaders in the model contact the 
voters and provide either a positive or a negative statement 
concerning a hypothesis. To calculate the expected posterior 
belief in the likelihood of the hypothesis (e.g. the goodness 
of the candidate), we apply the source credibility model. 
The equation used to calculate the posterior is an expanded 
version of Bayes’ theorem that incorporates trustworthiness 
and expertise within the theorem. It is taken from Harris et 
al. (2015) and relies on advances made in Bovens and 
Hartmann (2003) and Hahn et al. (2009) on the concept of 
source reliability (Hahn et al., 2012).  
 
where p(h|rep) represents the probability that the hypothesis 
is true (h) given a confirming statement (rep). P(h) 
represents the prior belief in the hypothesis, and p(rep|h) 
and p(rep|¬h) represent the conditional probability that the 
source would provide a positive statement if indeed the 
hypothesis was true or false. Trustworthiness and expertise 
are integrated within p(rep|h) and p(rep|¬h) through the 
combination of these conditionals2.  
To parameterise the model, p(exp) and p(trust) represent 
prior beliefs in expertise and trustworthiness. Conditional 
probabilities (see footnote 1) represent the epistemic 
relationship between model parameters and the likelihood of 
providing true or good advice. For example, p(rep|h, exp, 
trust) refers to the likelihood that a speaker declares a 
hypothesis to be true when the speaker has complete and 
perfect knowledge of the topic and is unequivocally 
trustworthy in a world where the hypothesis happens to be 
true regardless of the statement of the speaker.  
The model allows for parameter-free belief revision such 
that the agent makes use of its estimation of the persuader’s 
source credibility to update its belief when the persuader 
contacts the voter with a persuasive statement.  
Agent-Based Modelling 
Traditional equation-based models typically take point of 
departure in cognitive functionality in isolation (e.g. belief 
revision given new information) or in dyads (e.g. prisoners’ 
dilemma). However, when agents can interact and influence 
each other through time, across space and between multiple 
agents, behaviour may become dynamic and adaptive. If this 
happens, patterns may become computationally intractable, 
making predictions difficult or impossible with isolated or 
dyadic models, as the system becomes complex (see 
Parunak et al., 1998). ABMs allow for simulations of 
interactions between agents and their environment and 
between multiple agents (Epstein & Axtell, 1996). In the 
                                                            
2 p(rep|h) = p(rep|h, exp, trust) * p(exp) * p(trust) + p(rep|h, 
¬exp, trust) * p(¬exp) * p(trust) + p(rep|h, ¬exp, ¬trust) * p(¬exp) 
* p(¬trust) + p(rep|h, exp, ¬trust) * p(exp) * p(¬trust), mutatis 
mutandis for p(rep|¬h) 
paper, we use this method to simulate a campaign with 
interactions between politicians and voters. Each round in 
an ABM is called a tick. Here, each tick represents a 
campaign day. For the current model, the ABM requires 
agents and links between agents.  
Agents 
Agents are the actors in the simulated model world. The 
cognitive make-up of each agent may consist of any rules 
constrain or enable relevant behaviours within the simulated 
world. By applying the relevant cognitive rules, agents can 
revise their beliefs about the model world by interacting 
with the environment. Further, agents can have physical 
rules such as metabolism, energy consumption, and age. 
This allows for simulated life-spans in which agents can 
live, learn, generate progeny, and die. The physical and 
cognitive rules allow for heterogeneity, as agents may differ 
in essential characteristics. This allows for dynamic models 
of heterogeneous populations.  
In the ABM presented in this paper, there are three types 
of agents: voters, strategic persuaders and stochastic 
persuaders. The persuaders’ aim to convince the voters to 
support them in an election. Politicians engage with voters 
by providing a statement, supporting one candidate or the 
other (H = 0 or 1). Voters update their belief in the goodness 
of each candidate on the basis of the prior beliefs (p(h)) and 
their perception of the candidate (using the above Bayesian 
source credibility model).  
Links 
While agents have cognitive rules that apply to agents in 
isolation, ABMs allow for interactivity. Links represent 
connections between agents that may be encoded with 
functional capacities. These can be any and all social links 
that inform and influence behaviour. Links can be direct 
(e.g., providing information to another agent, fighting with 
another agent) or indirect (e.g., some agents might prefer to 
be in the vicinity of other types of agents). In the current 
model, only direct links are employed, as the persuaders 
contact voters directly.  
In the current model, politicians establish links by seeking 
out voters. Stochastic candidates engage randomly with 
voters while MTC candidates only engage with voter that 
has a positive attitude towards the candidate (using the 
‘signal factor’ described in the following section). There are 
no links between voters in the current model. Introducing 
social structure will be a natural development in future 
work. Indeed, we strongly suspect that MTC candidates 
would be more efficient in social structures, as they can 
target ‘community leaders’ and important social nodes.  
Simulating Micro-targeted campaign strategies 
In order to tentatively explore the effect of MTCs, we 
simulate the span of an election campaign through an ABM 
in which the politicians (the persuaders) can interact with 
the voters (the persuadees). Though exploratory in nature, 
the model has two aims. First, to our knowledge, although 
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some models have explored opinion chance in politics (e.g. 
Duggins, 2016), ABMs have not been used to directly 
explore campaign strategies. The paper consequently 
provides a new method for exploring the efficiency of 
persuasion campaign strategies. Second, by implementing a 
simplified voter and strategy model, the efficiency of 
minimal voter knowledge is explored. As the strategic 
potential of MTCs increases given higher voter complexity 
(e.g. if voters have prioritised political beliefs), the 
simplified model explores the efficiency of MTCs in 
situations where they are expected to be least effective. As 
such, the model explores a conservative modelling scenario. 
In the following, we present the Agent-Based Model.   
Agents The model consists of three types of agents: 
Voters, Micro-target persuader (MTC), and stochastic 
persuader (non-MTC). The physical space plays no role in 
the current model (as the interactions between the persuader 
and the persuadee may be likened to sending out pamphlets 
or generating cold-calls). Consequently, voters are randomly 
distributed across simulation space. All voters were outfitted 
with the Bayesian source credibility model to inform their 
belief revision process. To operationalise the model, each 
voter generates an expertise and trustworthy score for each 
candidate from a normal distribution (as described later, we 
manipulate the means in the two simulations, such that 
mean = 0.5 or = 0.6, SD = 0.25). To fully parameterize the 
model, agents are given conditional probabilities:  
 
H H H H ¬H ¬H ¬H ¬H 
T, E T, ¬E ¬T, E ¬T, ¬E T, E T, ¬E ¬T, E ¬T, ¬E 
80.38 58.21 34.63 18.04 22.59 42.3 59.90 71.26 
Table 1: Conditional probability table 
 
These are taken from Madsen (2016), as this study applies 
the model to political belief revision. This allows for belief 
revision given persuader statements (with no free 
parameters) and further allows for agent heterogeneity, as 
some agents will rate one candidate highly while another 
will rate the same candidate poorly.  
To provide a ‘signaling’ factor for the MTC candidate, 
voters average trustworthiness and expertise scores to 
generate a ‘credibility score’. Each voter generates a prior 
belief from a normal distribution (mean = 0.5, SD = 0.25, 
bounded between 0.01 and 1), representing a voter’s initial 
(prior) likelihood of voting for either candidate. This 
introduces the eventual decision (voting) rule: If a voter has 
p(candidate) < 0.5, it favours the non-MTC candidate; if 
p(candidate) > 0.5, it favours the MTC candidate. The 
campaign runs for 50 days (50 ticks). At the end of the 
simulation, voters vote for their favoured candidate. There 
are 10,000 voters in the simulation.  
Both persuaders’ aim to persuade voters to shift their 
p(candidate) towards their own position. In order to do so, 
they establish connection with voters and make opposite 
claims. In accordance with the source credibility model, the 
non-MTC candidate represents p(candidate) = 1 while the 
MTC candidate represents p(candidate) = 0. This gives full 
implementation of the Bayesian source credibility model 
where the voter updates the prior belief given representation 
by a (more or less) credible source. After each connection, 
the contacted voter takes P(candidate|rep) - i.e. the posterior 
- as their new value for p(candidate)3.  
For each tick, the candidate can establish contact with X 
voters, defined as ‘candidate reach’. In the simulations, the 
MTC candidate has a reach of 20 while we manipulate the 
reach of the non-MTC candidate to test the efficiency of the 
MTC strategy. In Fig. 2 below, the reach ratio is the reach 
of the non-MTC divided by the reach of the MTC.  
Central to the model, the MTC and non-MTC campaigns 
differ in their contact selectivity. The non-MTC is fully 
stochastic and thereby corresponds to a blind campaign that 
distributes leaflets or conducts cold-calls with no knowledge 
of the electorate. The MTC segments voters and will only 
contact voters with a favourable impression of the 
credibility of the candidate (voters with a signaling factor > 
0.5). This selection process does not take into account the 
voter’s prior belief in the candidate. As such, the underlying 
source credibility factors determine whether the voter is 
"open" to the candidate's message (i.e. will update in the 
desired manner). Of the sub-group of (desirable) voters who 
fit this criterion, a random selection (the amount based on 
"reach") are selected for contacting. Both campaigns may 
contact the same voter multiple times during the simulation, 
but not more than once on a single "day". 
In sum, voters entertain prior beliefs about each candidate, 
rate each candidate for trustworthiness and expertise, and 
have a signaling factor. When a candidate contacts the voter, 
the voter updates the belief in p(candidate) in accordance 
with the Bayesian source credibility model. Candidates are 
either stochastic (non-MTC) or use the signaling factor to 
identify favourably disposed voters. Each candidate can 
reach a fixed number of voters each click. There are 10.000 
voters and 2 candidates, and the campaign lasts for 50 days 
(ticks). At the end of each simulation, voters cast their vote 
for the candidate they find most favourable.    
Main findings 
We conduct two main manipulations. First, we manipulate 
the mean credibility rating of each candidate by altering 
voter perception of candidate trust and expertise (mean = .5 
or mean = .6, SD = .25), providing a 2x2 simulation. 
Second, for each of the credibility combinations, the reach 
ratio of the non-MTC is between 1-10 (1 represents 
simulations where the non-MTC and MTC have identical 
reach; 10 represents simulations where the non-MTC can 
reach 10 times as many voters per tick). The reach of the 
MTC candidate is always 20. Fig. 2 illustrates the 
percentage of voters who supported the non-MTC on the y-
axis and the reach ratio of the non-MTC on the x-axis.  
                                                            
3 While it is not possible in the current model, this enables 
negative campaigning, as candidates could provide a negative 
representation (e.g., p(candidate|¬rep)) and attacks designed to 
undermine the trustworthiness or expertise of the opposing 
candidate. Intentionally, the model is built compartmentally to 
allow for increasingly complex persuasion campaigns.  
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Fig. 2: Election outcome (p(cred) = .5; p(cred) = .6) 
 
The simulations point to two main conclusions. First, a non-
MTC with mean credibility rating of .5 is inefficient when 
run stochastically. As opinions about the candidate are 
equally divided, a stochastic strategy will necessarily 
engage with an equal number of supporters and adversaries. 
As such, blind strategies only work in when the campaign 
expect general voter estimation of the candidate to be > .5. 
If the candidate is seen as distrustful, a blind campaign will 
be ineffective or detrimental and will be beaten by 
campaigns with simple winnowing strategies.  
 Second, though MTCs provide a distinct advantage in 
terms of persuasion strategies, the stochastic campaign can 
beat the strategic campaign through brute force if the 
average p(cred) of the stochastic candidate is > 0.5. If the 
reach of the non-MTC is roughly double, the effect of the 
MTC is cancelled out. If the reach ratio > 2, the non-MTC 
edges out the strategic campaign. This is an interesting 
finding, as the MTC is effective, but can be beaten. Given 
the possibility of simulating and calculating a tipping point 
where a stochastic candidate (with credibility rating > .5 
among the voters) beat strategic campaigns, it is possible to 
conduct cost-benefit analyses to determine the best available 
strategy given a limited campaign budget. In general, 
though highly simplified, the simulations show that it is 
methodologically possible to estimate the expected effect of 
a strategic (or stochastic) persuasion campaign by applying 
cognitive rules to the persuaders and persuadees in a 
dynamic environment.    
Discussion and future developments 
The current model provides an important proof of concept 
that MTCs have a non-trivial advantage in a limited world 
where the voters revise their beliefs in the same manner and 
where the candidates can only advocate their position in a 
simplified way. We believe the paper provides a novel 
method for simulating and analysing electoral strategies 
using Agent-Based Models. However, as a proof of concept, 
this leaves room for further model developments.  
First, real-life voters may exhibit individual differences 
concerning moral foundation (Haidt, 2012) or reasoning 
strategies (Lodge & Taber, 2013). Voters in the current 
model are cognitively homogenous (though epistemically 
heterogenous) who revise their beliefs by the same process. 
Future work could integrate cognitive voter heterogeneity, 
which would allow for exploration of strategic choices. 
Adding personality profiles would make the model more 
realistic and interesting in terms of testing election strategies 
for actual elections. Further, real-life campaigners do not 
have a perfect signal from each voter. Consequently, noise 
needed to be added to voter signalling.  
Second, in the model, voters consider one proposition 
whereas elections often consist of a multitude of attitudes, 
beliefs, and desires. The present framework may easily be 
extended to include multiple policy beliefs, preference 
rankings, and multiple candidates.  
Third, the MTC only considers the favourability of the 
candidate. Given additional data about complex voters (e.g., 
policy preference, personality, etc.), a sophisticated MTC 
may target voters more strategically. For example, an MTC 
could differentiate between swing and secure voters. 
Additionally, some voters are more likely than others to 
vote regardless of their political conviction. This is essential 
for strategic implementation of get-out-the-vote strategies.  
Fourth, in the model, voters cannot communicate with 
each other. To allow for greater belief diffusion and for a 
more dynamic simulation of an electorate, it is reasonable to 
assume voter interaction where voters can share beliefs and 
persuade each other through their individual networks. 
Models that explore the role of hierarchy in opinion 
dynamics would be particularly relevant to explore this 
function (see e.g., Quattrociocchi et al 2014; Watts & 
Dodds, 2007). Some voters might be communal leaders and 
have more impact than others. Given weighted network 
structures of the electorate, it would be possible to simulate 
complex persuasion strategies. This would simulate the 
relative efficiency of MTCs in highly complex, highly 
dynamic, and highly adaptive elections.  
We predict that models with more complex voter belief 
systems, individual voter differences, and with interaction 
between voters will yield much higher benefits to MTCs. 
That is, we predict a positive correlation between available 
electorate data and the efficiency of an MTC. Concurrently, 
we also predict a positive correlation between the 
complexity of the electorate and the cost of running an 
MTC, as complex segmentation requires more data and 
sophisticated models.  
By applying a cognitive updating rule in an Agent-Based 
Model, the paper presents a new methodology for 
simulating dynamic persuasion campaigns and for 
estimating their expected effect. We show a strategic 
advantage of MTCs. In the simulations, non-MTCs require 
double reach to cancel out this advantage. Despite having 
only simple voter data that allows for crude segmentation 
and a very crude selection strategy, the MTC consistently 
bested stochastic a candidate with the same reach (even 
when the opponent had a greater average credibility). 
However, given greater reach, a positively perceived 
stochastic candidate can beat a strategic candidate.  
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